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PROPERTY
PAMELA B. MINZNER*

INTRODUCTION

This section of the Survey reviews case developments in areas of New
Mexico property law other than wills and trusts, which are treated separately;' community property, which is covered elsewhere; 2 and property
taxation, which is beyond the scope of this article.' The New Mexico
appellate courts decided the cases surveyed between April 1981 and March
1982.
The 1982 legislative session produced one bill which will have a major
impact on the law of property that is within the scope of this section of
*Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law. The author wishes to acknowledge,
with gratitude, the research assistance of Ms. Mary Ricketts, University of New Mexico School of
Law, J.D. 1984, and the editorial assistance of Ms. Carol Kennedy, University of New Mexico
School of Law staff.
1. See Alcock, Estates and Trusts, ante at 395.
2. See Kelsey & Siegel, Domestic Relations, ante at 379.
3. The two property taxation cases are La Jara Land Developers, Inc. v. Bernalillo County
Assessor, 97 N.M. 310, 639 P.2d 605 (Ct. App. 1982), and Grace, Inc. v. Boardof County Comm'rs,
97 N.M. 260, 639 P.2d 69 (Ct. App. 1981). In La JaraLand Developers. Inc., the plaintiff appealed
a decision and order of the county valuation protests board. The board had sustained the county
assessor's valuation of an improved tract. The court of appeals found that the county assessor had
failed to use the appropriate valuation method. The statute mandates the use of the "comparable
sales method" unless there is a lack of comparable sales data. If there is a lack of such data, the
cost or income method may be used. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 7-36-15(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1982). In La
Jara, the county assessor's own testimony provided direct evidence that the statutory method had
not been followed. Therefore, the statutory presumption in favor of the valuation's correctness had
been rebutted. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 7-38-6 (Repl. Pamp. 1982). The court reversed the board and
remanded the case with instructions to reassess the property in accordance with the Property Tax
Code. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-35-1 to 7-38-93 (Repl. Pamp. 1982).
In Grace, Inc., a nonprofit corporation governed by the laws and regulations of the Methodist
Church, claimed exemption as a charity, and sought a property tax refund in the district court. See
N.M. Const. art. VIII, §3. The constitution exempts from tax church property "not used for
commercial purposes" and all property used for education or charitable purposes. The parties stipulated that the plaintiff's sole purpose was to acquire land and when a Methodist Church was
established on any such land to deed the land to the church. The court of appeals sustained the trial
court's denial of the refund. In the view of the court, New Mexico case law has established a clear
interpretation of exempt "church property," which requires that the property be used actively for a
church purpose. Although the constitution was amended in 1972 to add the phrase "not used for
commercial purposes" to the words "church property," the court of appeals was not persuaded that
the addition was intended to eliminate the "use analysis" previously employed by the New Mexico
Supreme Court. See Church of the Holy Faith v. State Tax Comm'n, 39 N.M. 403, 48 P.2d 777
(1935).
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the Survey. House Bill 674 established the New Mexico Condominium
Act, which regulates the offering and sale of condominium units and
developments, provides for their maintenance and management, and prescribes the rights and duties of developers and purchasers. Because of
the length and complexity of the Act, it is not treated here. 5 A separate
article in a future issue will be devoted to the Condominium Act.
The New Mexico appellate courts considered over thirty cases in the
areas of landlord-tenant, easements, contracts and financing, deeds, land
use regulation, and real property actions. Each area produced both significant new principles and clarifying developments. Where possible, the
New Mexico courts tended to follow the direction of nearby states.
The property cases decided by the New Mexico appellate courts this
term reflect the technicality and rich conceptual heritage of property law
generally. Sometimes technical rules were used to produce desired results.' Sometimes technical rules were abandoned in order to produce
desired results. 7 The courts continued to give guidance on the nature of
certain property interests, such as that of a vendee under a real estate
contract,8 that of a tenant under a residential lease, 9 and that of a party
named in a joint tenancy deed."0 There was even one bailment case."
Of particular interest were cases which tended to reduce the distinctive
character of property transactions by applying contract law principles to
such transactions. For example, the New Mexico Supreme Court this
4. 1982 N.M. Laws ch. 27 (codified at N.M. Stat. Ann. §§47-7A-I to 47-7D-20 (Repl. Pamp.
1982)).
5. The New Mexico Condominium Act enacts much of the Uniform Condominium Act, which
received final approval by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in
August 1977. Other states which have adopted the Uniform Condominium Act include louisiana,
Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia. In 1980, the Uniform Condominium Act was introduced
in the legislatures of ten states, including Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, and Wyoming. Ms. Janice M.
Ahem, Mr. Dennis McCary, and Mr. John Patterson of the New Mexico Bar were active in lobbying
for the amended version of the Uniform Condominium Act which New Mexico has adopted.
6. See, e.g., L.R. Property Management, Inc. v. Grebe, 96 N.M. 22, 627 P.2d 864 (Ct. App.
1981), discussed infra at notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Julian, 96 N.M. 38, 627 P.2d 880 (1981), discussed infra at
notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Shindledecker v. Savage, 96 N.M. 42, 627 P.2d 1241 (1981), discussed infra at
notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., T.W.I.W., Inc. v. Rhudy, 96 N.M. 354, 630 P.2d 753 (1981), discussed infra at
notes 33-44 and accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., Ohl v. Ohl, 97 N.M. 175, 637 P.2d 1230 (1981), discussed infra at notes 86-88
and accompanying text.
11.Vigil v. Rush, 96 N.M. 667, 634 P.2d 689 (1981). This case, which is not treated in the
text, involved a suit by a bailee for declaratory relief absolving him of all liability for the loss of
an insulation blower owned by the defendants. The trial court had found an express acceptance of
responsibility for loss. The equipment had been destroyed by fire, and the issue was whether there
was substantial evidence to support the trial court finding. The supreme court affirmed the trial court.
One of the defendants testified that the plaintiff asked him "ifsomething should happen, what does
it cost me?" and the defendant answered that the entire unit was worth $8,500. Id. at 667, 634 P.2d
at 689. The supreme court noted that it is for the trier of fact to weigh credibility.
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term decided that a landlord did not have an unqualified right to withhold
consent pursuant to a lease provision which required written consent to
a tenant's assignment or sublease. 2 Further, the New Mexico Supreme
Court considered and decided the question of the appropriate measure of
damages under a title insurance policy when title fails on part of a tract'3
and recognized "benefit of the bargain" damages in an action for fraud
in the sale of real property.' 4
In some cases, property case law retained its distinctive character. The
New Mexico Supreme Court used traditional construction principles when
it decided an express easement case and a landlord-tenant problem.' 5 The
supreme court also sustained the 6legislative determination that "due-onsale" clauses are unenforceable. '
The property decisions this term ultimately reflect the evolutionary
character of this area of law. In the prescriptive easement cases, the courts
have been developing a theory that corresponds to that applied in adverse
possession cases. 1 The tendency to integrate contract law analysis and
property transactions, which is apparent in this term, also represents a
steady development. Finally, the small but discrete body of land use cases
evidences the growing importance of the public interest in private property
law.
LANDLORD-TENANT
The New Mexico Supreme Court rendered three opinions this past year
dealing with the landlord-tenant relationship. Two decisions involved
commercial leases. The third decision contained significant analysis of
in New
the Uniform Owner-Resident Relations Act,' 8 which was enacted
20
Mexico in 197519 and which governs most residential leases.
12. See, e.g., Boss Barbara, Inc. v. Newbill, 97 N.M. 239, 638 P.2d 1084 (1982), discussed
infra at notes 21-28 and accompanying text. See also Johnson, Commercial Law, ante at 293.
13. See, e.g., Hartman v. Shambaugh, 96 N.M. 359, 630 P.2d 758 (1981), discussed infra at
notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
14. Wirth v. Commercial Resources, Inc., 96 N.M. 340, 630 P.2d 292, cert. denied, 96 N.M.
543, 632 P.2d 1181 (1981), discussed infra at notes 120-121 and accompanying text.
15. See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Sims, 97 N.M. 324, 639 P.2d 1178 (1981) (easement), discussed
infra at notes 58-59 and accompanying text; L.R. Property Management, Inc. v. Grebe, 96 N.M.
22, 627 P.2d 864 (1981) (landlord-tenant), discussed infra at notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
16. State ex rel. Bingaman v. Valley Savings & Loan Ass'n, 97 N.M. 8, 636 P.2d 279 (1981),
discussed infra at notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., Matsu v. Chavez, 96 N.M. 775, 635 P.2d 584 (1981), discussed infra at note 54
and accompanying text.
18. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§47-8-1 to -51 (Repl. Pamp. 1982) (hereinafter sometimes referred to as
the Act).
19. For a valuable section-by-section commentary on the Uniform Owner-Resident Relations Act,
see Calvert, Property, 6 N.M.L. Rev. 293 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Calvert]. The article was
written by Carl A. Calvert, then a student and now a member of the New Mexico Bar.
20. The Uniform Owner-Resident Relations Act applies only to dwelling units, a term defined
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In Boss Barbara, Inc. v. Newbill,2" the New Mexico Supreme Court
held that a lease clause requiring the lessor's written consent for assignment or sublease of a commercial premise does not give the lessor an
unqualified right to withhold consent. The court reasoned that because a
lease is a contract, it should be governed by general contract principles
of good faith and commercial reasonableness. Further, good faith is required under the Uniform Owner-Resident Relations Act in renting residential property, and logic compels that the same rule be applied to
commercial premises.
In Boss Barbara, the lessee brought action in the district court for
injunctive and declaratory relief against the lessor for refusal to negotiate
and accept a new lease. In 1978, the lessor had entered a lease which
contained a provision that the lessee might not assign or sublet its interest
without the lessor's written permission. The lease also provided that
consent to one assignment would not be considered a consent to further
assignments. Subsequently, the original lessee, with the lessor's consent,
subleased to Boss Barbara. When Boss Barbara requested permission to
sublease, however, the lessor refused to consent. Boss Barbara renounced
the lease and refused to pay further rent, as did the sublessor. The lessor
sought termination of the lease and back rent.
The trial court found an implied condition under the circumstances of
this case that consent shall not be withheld unreasonably or arbitrarily
and that the lessor had so acted. As a result, the trial court entered
judgment for Boss Barbara and terminated the lease. Further, the trial
court entered judgment for the sublessor abating rent until the lessor
consented to a sublease.
On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the trial court on the ground
that under the majority rule, a lessor has an unqualified right to withhold
consent and that such a result construed the language of the contract most
closely to its plain meaning.2 2 The New Mexico Supreme Court reversed
the court of appeals, but noted that the lease was silent as to standards
and that restraints on alienation are to be strictly construed. 23 Such a
caveat may signal the court's willingness to uphold clauses which require
consent to transfer if the lease articulates a reasonable standard of acceptability. In the case at hand, the New Mexico Supreme Court stated
by the Act. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §47-8-3(E) (Repl. Pamp. 1982). The effective date of the Act is
July 1, 1975, but under some circumstances prior transactions may be covered by the Act. See
Calvert, supra note 19, at 295-96. Further, the Act exempts six particular types of residential
housing. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 47-8-9(A)-(F) (1981). These exemptions are discussed in Calvert,
supra note 19, at 296-98.
21. 97 N.M. 239, 638 P.2d 1084 (1982). For further discussion of Boss Barbara, see Johnson,
Commerical Law, ante at 293.
22. See 20 N.M. St. B. Bull. 1042 (Oct. 1, 1981), for the court of appeals' decision.
23. 97 N.M. 239, 241, 638 P.2d 1084, 1086 (1982).
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must apply are those
that the standards of acceptability the landlord
24
governing acceptance of the original tenant.
The New Mexico Supreme Court also affirmed the trial court in this
case. It is noteworthy that the trial court terminated the sublease upon
breach of the landlord's duty to act reasonably in withholding consent to
transfer. 25 The trial court's remedy suggests that the tenant's obligation
to pay rent is dependent upon the landlord's duty to act reasonably. Yet,
classically most landlord-tenant duties and obligations have been deemed
to be independent.26 In other words, breach of a party's duty generally
did not excuse the other party from performance. 27 Perhaps the supreme
court is tacitly recognizing a larger area of impliedly dependent covenants
for landlord and tenant.
If so, then the New Mexico Supreme Court's allusion to the Uniform
Owner-Resident Relations Act may be particularly significant. In its opinion, the court observed that the Act requires good faith in the rental of
a dwelling and logic suggests the appropriateness of a similar rule for
commercial leases. If impliedly dependent covenants for commercial leases
are to increase in number and scope, the Act may provide guidance by
analogy in identifying
additional covenants for which such analysis is
28
appropriate.
The second commercial lease problem which the New Mexico Supreme
Court faced this term presented both a procedural issue and an interpretation issue. In L.R. Property Management, Inc. v. Grebe,29 the New
Mexico Supreme Court held that the plaintiff, which was managing the
property, was not a real party in interest in an action to recover damages
from a tenant because there was no evidence of an oral or written assignment of the lease to plaintiff. In dicta, the court suggested that because
the original lease was for more than one year, the assignment would have
been effective only if written.3" In this case the plaintiff had proved only
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See Brown's Adm'rs v. Bragg, 22 Ind. 122 (1864); Stewart v. Childs Co., 86 N.J.L. 648,
92 A. 392 (1914); see generally 3A A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 686 (1960).
27. One exception to the general rule was the covenant of quiet enjoyment. See Fifth Avenue
Bldg. Co. v. Kemochan, 221 N.Y. 370, 117 N.E. 579 (1917). Of course, the parties could make
covenants which were dependent by express agreement. This possibility seldom benefitted a tenant
of residential property because landlords tend to prepare residential leases.
28. The Uniform Owner-Resident Relations Act, for example, creates a series of specific duties
owed by the owner for breach of which the resident may terminate the rental agreement. See, e.g.,
N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 47-8-20(A)(l)-(6), 47-8-29 (Repl. Pamp. 1982). For a dicussion of these sections
and others, see Calvert, supra note 19, at 310-20.
29. 96 N.M. 22, 627 P.2d 864 (1981).
30. The court cites Merrill v. Klein, 51 N.M. 498, 188 P.2d 609 (1947). That case does state
the principle, but it was not necessary to the holding. For prior authority to the contrary, see Calvert,
supra note 19, at 298 n.32.
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that it was exercising managerial functions with respect to the shopping
center which contained the leased premises.
Although the court's disposition of the procedural issue was an adequate
reversal of the trial court, the supreme court also decided a question of
interpretation in order to resolve the ultimate controversy. The lease had
been executed by two individuals on behalf of a corporate entity as tenant.
The introductory lines of the lease, however, described the two individuals
as doing business under the name of the corporate entity. The plaintiff
had sued the two individuals to recover damages under the lease.
The court believed that the lease contained an ambiguity which must
be construed against the landlord, who prepared the lease. The court held
that the defendants were not liable individually on the lease and directed
the district court to enter judgment in favor of the defendants.
The supreme court noted that "[i]t would have been very easy for the
landlord to create individual liability"'" on the part of the defendants. In
the ordinary situation of which this case may or may not be representative,
32
clearer evidence of an assignment should be available to the landlord.
Thus, L.R. Property Management, Inc., may represent the unusual situation in which a successor landlord is unable to make a prima facie case
of owning the lease and for individual liability.
The third landlord-tenant case concerned a residential lease. In this
case, T.W.I.W., Inc. v. Rhudy,33 the supreme court decided that the Uniform Owner-Resident Relations Act required a landlord to provide heat
unless the landlord can show statutory or other legal exemption from the
duty imposed by the Act. In addition, the court determined that a notice
to quit which failed to provide a full month's notice would be effective
at the end of the next rental period. The notice need not state a termination
date. This opinion is a welcome clarification of the Act and an application
of common law principles to areas on which the Act was understandably
silent.
In Rhudy, the landlord had brought an unlawful detainer proceeding
for nonpayment of rent and a gas utility bill. The district court found for
the landlord. The tenant appealed. The supreme court affirmed in part
and reversed and remanded in part. The premises in question were rented
in 1979 pursuant to an oral month-to-month lease.
On appeal, the supreme court considered and rejected an argument that
the tenant has the burden of demonstrating a law other than the Act which
requires that the owner provide reasonable heat. The court accepted the
proposition that the controlling provisions of the Act were ambiguous.
31. 96 N.M. at 24, 627 P.2d at 866.
32. In this case, the plaintiff "placed in evidence an order accepting a receiver's final account
and report, and discharging it as a receiver for" the shopping center. Id. at 23, 627 P.2d at 865.
33. 96 N.M. 354, 630 P.2d 753 (1981).
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The Act, in one section, requires the owner to provide certain minimum
conditions in the dwelling. 34 Another subsection requires the owner to
supply reasonable heat "except where the building that includes the dwelling unit is not required by law to be equipped for that purpose." 3 5 Yet
another, introductory, subsection requires that the owner substantially
comply with applicable housing codes. 36 The court's resolution of the
ambiguity created by these sections should be helpful in other situations.
The court first considered evidence of the legislature's intent. The
legislature declared its intent, among other things, "to encourage the
owners and the residents to maintain and improve the quality of housing
in New Mexico." 3 7 The court reasoned that as remedial legislation in
derogation of the common law, the terms of the Act should be liberally
construed. Further, the statute should be construed if possible so that
none of its provisions is surplus. Because one section of the Act requires
that owners comply with applicable codes,38 the section which specifically
treats the duty to heat ought not be read to require that a landlord supply
heat only if a code provision to that effect exists. Rather, if the subsection
requiring code compliance applies, the other, more specific requirements
never apply. The supreme court remanded the case with respect to this
issue and directed the trial court to take evidence on whether a specific
exemption existed and if not, whether the landlord provided reasonable
heat.
The New Mexico Supreme Court also tackled a question that at common
law produced relatively technical results. In T.W.I.W., Inc. v. Rhudy, the
landlord had given a notice to quit toward the end of the rental period
which failed to give a full thirty days' notice. In some jurisdictions, such
a notice would be ineffective for all purposes.39 The New Mexico Supreme

Court, however, held that such a notice is effective for the next possible
rental date. In part, the court relied on the fact that the Act requires, for
a month-to-month residency, only that written notice be given "at least
thirty days prior to the periodic rental date." 4"
The court also outlined other attributes of an effective notice to quit.
Such a notice must be "sufficiently definite to inform the tenants of the
landlord's desire that they vacate."'" In the case before the court, the
landlord had notified the tenant that "[i]n the event you do not deem it
possible to move at the present time, you are now advised that your rent
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

N.M. Stat. Ann.
N.M. Stat. Ann.
N.M. Stat. Ann.
N.M. Stat. Ann.
N.M. Stat. Ann.
See May v. Rice,
N.M. Stat. Ann.
96 N.M. at 358,

§47-8-20(A)(2)-(5) (Repl. Pamp. 1982).
§47-8-20(A)(6) (Repl. Pamp. 1982).
§47-8-20(A)(1) (Repl. Pamp. 1982).
§47-8-2 (Repl. Pamp. 1982).
§47-8-20(A)(1) (Repl. Pamp. 1982).
108 Mass. 150 (1871); Sanford v. Harvey, 65 Mass. (11 Cush.) 93 (1853).
§47-8-37(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1982).
630 P.2d at 757.
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will be raised" to a specific sum on a specific date.42 The court found
such a notice "equivocal" because the tenant could have interpreted the
notice to mean that she could remain at an increased rental.
The court found that a second notice to quit, which did give at least
thirty days, was effective even though it did not specify a proper date of
termination. The court did not discuss that portion of the applicable statute
which states that a date must be specified in the notice. 43
The notice which the court construed as effective read in relevant part:
"To comply with legal requirements, this is your official notice to vacate
.One can argue that such a
the T.W.I.W. property immediately ....
notice is ambiguous in light of the statutory requirement of thirty days'
notice. It is also arguable, however, that when one ineffective notice has
been given, a second notice acquires some meaning in relationship to the
first.
EASEMENTS
The New Mexico Supreme Court decided four easement cases this
term, three of which concerned the acquisition of an easement by prescription.45 The fourth case elaborated the rules relative to creating express
easements and further explained a phrase, "right to 46ingress and egress,"
which had caused interpretive difficulty previously.

The topic of prescriptive easements is confusing, in part because the
principle on which an easement by prescription is based borrows much
but not all of its content from the law of adverse possession. Thus, longcontinued use of another's land for the length of time demanded for title47
by adverse possession will give rise to an easement by prescription.
Unlike adverse possession, however, a prescriptive easement requires
"use" rather than "possession." Further, unlike adverse possession, often
(as in New Mexico) no statute exists to govern the acquisition of easements
by prescription. The courts have borrowed, as seemed appropriate, so
much of the law of adverse possession as was necessary to fashion an
equivalent doctrine for easements. 48
Prescriptive easement cases tend to reflect this ambivalent theoretical
42. Id.
43. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 47-8-37(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1982), provides that the "owner or the resident
may terminate a month-to-month residency by a written notice given to the other at least thirty days
prior to the periodic rental date specified in the notice" (emphasis added).
44. 96 N.M. at 358, 630 P.2d at 757.
45. The three cases are Village of Capitan v. Kaywood, 96 N.M. 524, 632 P.2d 1162 (1981);
Matsu v. Chavez, 96 N.M. 775, 635 P.2d 584 (1981); and Gilman v. McCrary, 97 N.M. 376, 640
P.2d 482 (1982).
46. Amoco Production Co. v. Sims, 97 N.M. 324, 639 P.2d 1178 (1981).
47. The leading case in New Mexico is Hester v. Sawyers, 41 N.M. 497, 71 P.2d 646 (1937).
48. Id. at 502, 71 P.2d at 649; see also 3 R. Powell, The Law of Real Property §413 (1981).
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underpinning. 49 For example, it has been said elsewhere, and also in New

Mexico, that the common law theory rested on a use which had continued
for so long that the law presumes it5 to have been based on a lost grant.5 0
However, the use must be adverse. '

The person seeking a prescriptive easement runs some risk in taking
such language too seriously. He or she wants to prove "acquiescence"
as evidence of a lost grant but must avoid express or implied
consent
52
which will defeat the claims as insufficiently "adverse."
The three prescriptive easement cases this term all concerned this general problem and provide support for the prospective easement owner. In
Village of Capitan v. Kaywood, 53 and in Matsu v. Chavez,5" the New
Mexico Supreme Court affirmed a presumption of adverse use, under
claim of right. In the former case, the trial court finding of permissive
use was overturned because there was no evidence of express consent
and the general presumption applied. In the latter case, the trial court
finding that the users had not acted under claim of right was deemed
irrelevant. The Matsu court reasoned that proof of open, notorious, continuous and uninterrupted use for the requisite period, without evidence
of how the use began, gave rise to the general presumption of adverse
use, under claim of right. These two cases seem to emphasize a close
relationship in New Mexico between the law of adverse possession and
that of prescriptive easements.
Gilman v. McCrary55 addressed the question whether a prescriptive
easement may be gained when the record owner does not know for sure
49. Professor Cribbett has written:

If a presumption of lost grant is the true basis, then acquiescence of the fee owner
in the use is material since it strengthens the fiction that at some time a right was
granted to the user. A letter of protest . . . would thus seem to be fatal to a
prescriptive right since it negates acquiescence. . . . However, if the true basis
is the adverseness of the use, the protest would seem to strengthen the case for
the claimant and would not prevent the acquisition of the easement.
J. Cribbet, Principles of Property 340-41 (2d ed. 1975). Professor Cribbet suggests comparing
Dartnell v. Bidwell, 115 Me. 227, 98 A. 743 (1916), which found that a protest by the fee owner
prevented the acquisition of a prescriptive right, with Lunt v. Kitchens, 123 Utah 488, 260 P.2d
535 (1953), which suggests that protest by the fee owner might strengthen the case for a prescriptive

right. In Lunt, the court found that the fee owner's acquiescence gave rise to a permissive, nonadverse
use.

50. See, e.g., Hester v. Sawyers, 41 N.M. 497, 502, 71 P.2d 646, 650 (1937).
51. Id. at 504, 71 P.2d at 651.
52. A leading property casebook has suggested Jones v. Tierney-Sinclair, 71 Cal. App. 2d 366,
162 P.2d 669 (1945), as a good example of the "fine . . . line the claimant to prescription has to
tread in showing that the user was with the acquiescence but not the permission of the true owner."
C. Donahue, T. Kauper & P. Martin, Property: An Introduction to the Concept and the Institution
131 (1974). An excellent, brief historical treatment of prescription appears in this casebook at pages
129-32.
53. 96 N.M. 524, 632 P.2d 1162 (1981).
54. 96 N.M. 775, 635 P.2d 584 (1981).
55. 97 N.M. 376, 640 P.2d 482 (1982).
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whether he owns the land and when the landowner and the person claiming
an easement by prescription have used the land in common. The court
held that a prescriptive easement can be obtained even if ownership is in
dispute, provided the person against whom an easement is sought claims
ownership. Further, the court held that although there is a split of authority
as to whether use in common by landowner and another is presumptively
permissive, the better view permits such use in proof of an easement by
prescription. The exclusivity requirement, unlike that of adverse possession law, means only that the asserted use must not be dependent upon
the rights of others.
In Gilman, the New Mexico Supreme Court recognized the distinctive
nature of a prescriptive easement and specifically distinguished the comparable adverse possession rules. However, from another perspective, the
court emphasized a close functional relationship between the two doctrinal
areas. The Gilman opinion increased the usefulness of prescriptive easement theory by limiting, as did its companion cases, the number of
"presumptively permissive" fact patterns. Thus, prescriptive easement
theory will tend to ratify long-standing use, and, in an analogous way,
adverse possession will tend to "ratify" longstanding possession.
The fourth easement case this term is most remarkable in its clarification
of an earlier supreme court opinion, Martinez v. Martinez.16 In that case,
the New Mexico Supreme Court had interpreted a grant of the "right of
ingress and egress" to include an express easement over land not specifically named in the granting instrument. 57 In Amoco Production Co.
v. Sims, 58 the New Mexico Supreme Court limited the Martinez case to
its unique fact pattern.
In Amoco, a landowner had conveyed a tract to the defendants in 1952,
reserving the oil and gas mineral rights plus "the right to ingress and
egress for the purpose of developing same." Subsequently, the grantor's
successor in interest claimed that, under the Martinez case, the phrase
"right of ingress and egress" gave him an express easement over the
defendants' land, some of which they had owned in 1952 and some of
which they acquired thereafter.
The court rejected the argument. The court noted that the Martinez
case involved a number of heirs who settled their father's estate and
divided the tenancy in common inherited upon his death by giving quitclaim deeds among themselves. The court felt that the "right of ingress
and egress," while nonspecific as to servient estate, was sufficiently clear
56. 93 N.M. 673, 604 P.2d 366 (1979).
57. For further discussion of Martinez. see Fisher, Property, I I N.M.L. Rev. 203, 212 (198081). Ms. Diane Fisher, a member of the New Mexico Bar, wrote the Survey on property for 197980).
58. 97 N.M. 324, 639 P.2d 1178 (1981).
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under the circumstances. The father's will had expressed the intent that
all of the heirs would be able to use the roads in question.
In Amoco, on the other hand, the grantor had specifically reserved an
easement in himself. Ordinarily, the lack of words of grant would defeat
the possibility of creating an easement in a third party by the grantor,
and the lack of words of grant and the lack of a signature by the grantee
would defeat the implication of an easement from the defendants-grantees
to the grantor. Further, the grantor created the easement for the specific
and limited purpose of developing minerals on his tract. The court appeared to have observed traditional rules of construction in denying the
plaintiff's claim in Amoco and in limiting the Martinez ruling. 5 9
CONTRACTS AND FINANCING

The appellate courts decided six cases which involved installment sales
contracts (real estate contracts) and mortgages. The real estate contract
cases provide valuable insight into the nature of the vendee's interest
under such a contract.' The mortgage cases include the supreme court's
decision with respect to due-on-sale clauses, 6' as well as a helpful case
on the nature and scope of foreclosure proceedings. 62 Real estate contracts
in New Mexico are frequently employed as financing devices. The nature
of the parties' interest under a real estate contract has been the subject
63
of appellate discussion on many occasions.
In the 1979-80 Survey year, the New Mexico Supreme Court reaffirmed
the status of the doctrine of equitable conversion with respect to the
vendor's interest.' In this Survey year, the court reaffirmed the doctrine
with respect to the vendee's interest. In Withers v. Board of County
Commissioners,65 the court construed the terms of an invitation to bid
59. See Restatement of Property § 467 (1944).
60. The real estate contract cases decided this term are Withers v. Board of County Comm'rs,
96 N.M. 71, 628 P.2d 316 (Ct. App. 1981); Shindledecker v. Savage, 96 N.M. 42, 627 P.2d 1241
(1981); and Lynch v. Santa Fe Nat'l Bank,__ N.M. __, 627 P.2d 1247 (Ct. App.), cert. denied.
N.M....., P.2d (1981). Due to a printing error, Lynch does not appear in the New
Mexico Reports at this time.
61. State ex rel. Bingaman v. Valley Savings & Loan Ass'n, 97 N.M. 8, 636 P.2d 279 (1981).
62. First Nat'l Bank v. Julian, 96 N.M. 38, 627 P.2d 880 (1981).
63. See, e.g., Marks v. City of Tucumcari, 93 N.M. 4, 595 P.2d 1199 (1979); Hale v. Whitlock,
92 N.M. 657, 593 P.2d 754 (1979); MGIC Mortgage Corp. v. Bowen, 91 N.M. 200, 577 P.2d 547
(1977); Eiferle v. Toppino, 90 N.M. 469, 565 P.2d 340 (1977); Campos v. Warner, 90 N.M. 63,
559 P.2d 1190 (1977); Mutual Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Collins, 85 N.M. 706, 516 P.2d 677 (1973);
Gregg v. Gardner, 73 N.M. 347, 388 P.2d 68 (1963); Davies v. Boyd, 73 N.M. 85, 385 P.2d 950
(1963); Bishop v. Beecher, 67 N.M. 339, 355 P.2d 277 (1960); Nelms v. Miller, 56 N.M. 132, 241
P.2d 333 (1952); Petrakis v. Krasnow, 54 N.M. 39, 213 P.2d 220 (1949); Mesich v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 46 N.M. 412, 129 P.2d 974 (1942); Ott v. Keller, 90 N.M. 1, 558 P.2d 613 (Ct. App.
1976).
64. Marks v. City of Tucumcari, 93 N.M. 4, 595 P.2d 1199 (1979).
65. 96 N.M. 71, 628 P.2d 316 (Ct. App. 1981).
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issued by the county which provided special terms for an "adjacent
landowner." The court determined that the purchaser under a real estate
contract qualified as a "landowner" for purposes of the bid because under
the doctrine of equitable conversion, the vendee owns realty rather than
personalty.
The New Mexico Supreme Court further explained the interest of the
vendee this term in Shindledecker v. Savage.16 In this case, the vendees
under a real estate contract had transferred to Shindledecker an interest
in the contract by way of what was called a "second mortgage." Subsequently, the vendees instructed the escrow agent to give to the vendor
the special warranty deed held in escrow. The vendor then sold to another
who subsequently resold to yet another. Shindledecker ultimately sued
his debtor (the original vendee) and the present owner of the property in
an effort to collect the debt and "foreclose" the "mortgage." The trial
court gave him judgment for his debt but denied his other claims.
Although the supreme court affirmed the trial court, it noted that the
majority rule recognizes that the vendee, as owner of an equitable interest,
has a mortgageable interest. The person to whom such an interest is
mortgaged, however, acquires only that which his transferor has and can
enforce his rights only if the contract is kept in force. In the existing fact
pattern, Shindledecker was unable to enforce his, interest against the
present owner of the land because the creditor had not given notice of
his interest so as to bind the present owner. The opinion does not specify
the reason the present owners were not bound. The recording act probably
protected the present owners inasmuch as the creditor's "second mort"chain of title" which the present
gage," if recorded, was outside the
67
owners would have had to search.
As the New Mexico Court of Appeals noted this term, "real estate
68
contracts are regularly, and possibly customarily, placed in escrow." In
69
Lynch v. Santa Fe National Bank, the court reviewed contract language
which excused acts of an escrow agent done in good faith as well as
those which resulted from negligence other than that which was willful
or gross. The escrow agent admitted negligence in terminating certain
escrow arrangements but denied liability, in reliance on the exculpatory
66. 96 N.M. 42, 627 P.2d 1241 (1981). For further discussion of Shindledecker, see Note, Real
Estate Contracts-When Recording of a Lien Instrument Is Not Notice to the Whole World-Actual
Notice Required to Protect Second Lien on a Real Estate Contract: Shindledecker v. Savage, 13
N.M.L. Rev. 177 (1983).
67. The court noted that the present owner had no knowledge of plaintiff's interest nor would a
title search have revealed any. 96 N.M. at 44, 627 P.2d at 1243.
627 P.2d 1247, 1252 (1981). For further
68. Lynch v. Santa Fe Nat'l Bank, - N.M.....
discussion of this case, see Johnson, CommercialLaw,ante at 293, and Note, Contracts-Exculpatory
Provisions-A Bank's Liability for Ordinary Negligence: Lynch v. Santa Fe National Bank, 12 N.M.L.
Rev. 821 (1982).
N.M.__, 627 P.2d 1247 (1981).
69. -
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clause. The plaintiff sought damages after successfully suing to reinstate
the escrow arrangements. The trial court dismissed the complaint, and
the court of appeals affirmed that decision.
In a carefully worded opinion, the New Mexico Supreme Court refused
to deny effect to the escrow agreement's exculpatory language. The supreme court acknowledged that such clauses ought not be enforced where
the promisee enjoys superior bargaining power. In this case, however,
the court noted that the record did not indicate that the promisor lacked
alternatives; therefore, there was insufficient evidence that the promisor
was "required to deal" with the defendant escrow agent on its own terms.
The court also acknowledged that California has held that escrow services are a service of public interest for which exculpatory provisions are
inappropriate and unenforceable. 7" The New Mexico court rejected the
California analysis in part on the ground that California statutes regulate
escrow services. 7' Such regulation cloaks California escrow services with
a public interest which New Mexico escrow agents lack.
Two of the three mortgage cases decided this term are more significant
procedurally than they are substantively. In First National Bank v. Julian," the supreme court affirmed its earlier decision73 that a defective
corporate acknowledgment precludes a mechanic's lien from being treated
as recorded and gives a mortgage priority. The court also decided that
under some circumstances, failure to obtain personal jurisdiction over the
debtor will not prevent a mechanic, whose lien was properly recorded,
from acquiring priority over the mortgagee in a foreclosure proceeding.
The court reasoned that such liens are "creatures of statute, remedial in
nature and have their basis in equity." 7 4 Because the trial court had the
power to permit the lienor to be paid prior to satisfying the mortgagee,
the supreme court reversed the trial court's refusal to give the lienor
priority. The facts of the case were unusual, and the court noted that the
mortgagee was not able to claim prejudice75 by reason of the lienor's failure
to serve the debtor, who had defaulted.
70. Id. at -,
627 P.2d at 1252-53. The New Mexico Supreme Court cited Akin v. Business
Title Corp., 264 Cal. App. 2d 153, 70 Cal. Rptr. 287 (1968).
71. -

N.M. at __, 627 P.2d at 1253.

72. 96 N.M. 38, 627 P.2d 880 (1981).
73. The earlier decision was New Mexico Properties v. Lennox Indus., 95 N.M. 64, 618 P.2d
1228 (1980).
74. 96 N.M. at 41, 627 P.2d at 883.
75. The mortgagee had served the debtor personally with the original complaint, which sought
a determination of priorities and foreclosure. Subsequently, the mortgagee filed and served the debtor
personally with an amended complaint which specifically included the lienor as an interested party.
The lienor answered, seeking priority for his lien, but the debtor defaulted before the lienor obtained
either personal or in rem jurisdiction on his cross-complaint.
The mortgagee had stipulated to the validity and amount of the lien. Even if personal jurisdiction
over the debtor had been obtained, the only issues that would have been resolved were the validity
and amount of the lien. Because the bank had stipulated to those issues, the court found that the
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In a second foreclosure case, Security Bank & Trust v. Parmer,7 6 the
New Mexico Supreme Court reversed a grant of summary judgment. The
motion had been made by a creditor who claimed it had released a superior
lien as a result of the mortgagee's fraudulent misrepresentation. The
moving party sought return of the property secured by fraud within the
foreclosure proceeding. Because the court felt there was a genuine issue
of material fact which precluded summary judgment, it did not reach the
second issue raised on appeal, which was whether the remedy sought
was appropriate.
The third mortgage case, State ex rel. Bingaman v. Valley Savings &
Loan Association,77 settled the status under state law of "due-on-sale"
clauses contained in mortgages executed prior to March 15, 1979. In
1979, the legislature enacted a statute making such clauses unenforceable
unless the lender's interest was substantially impaired by the pending
transfer.78 Subsequently, the attorney general brought suit against sixteen
state-chartered savings and loan associations to enforce the legislation
and to obtain restitution and civil penalties. The trial court found for the
attorney general, and Valley Savings & Loan appealed.
On appeal, the supreme court considered, among other things, the
appellant's argument that the legislation was not intended to apply and
constitutionally could not apply to pre-existing mortgages. The court
concluded that "due-on-sale" clauses which predated the statute violated
the common law rule against restraints on alienation. The court reasoned
that in New Mexico, unreasonable restraints on the alienation of property
were unenforceable, and that certain due-on-sale clauses were unreasonable and unenforceable before the statute was enacted. Those clauses that
permitted acceleration of payment or increased interest rates upon transfer
without a showing that the lender's security had been substantially impaired were, in the court's view, unenforceable before the statute. Therefore, appellant could not enforce its "due-on-sale" clauses whether the
mortgages which contain them were executed before or after March 15,
1979. 79
bank was not prejudiced by the lienor's failure to obtain personal jurisdiction over the debtor.
Because the debtor had notice and an opportunity to be heard with respect to the amended complaint,
the court found that the lien was not barred for lack of due process.
76. 97 N.M. 108, 637 P.2d 539 (1981).
77. 97 N.M. 8, 636 P.2d 279 (1981).
78. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§48-7-11 to-14 (Cum. Supp. 1982). The statutes apply tomortgages or
deeds of trust securing an interest in residential property of no more than four units.
79. The practical significance of the decision was diminished recently when the United States
Supreme Court issued its opinion in Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta. 50 U.S.L.W.
4916 (U.S. June 28, 1982). In that decision, the Court ruled that the 1976 Federal Home Loan Bank
Board regulation permitting federal savings and loan associations to use "due-on-sale" clauses in
their mortgage contracts preempts state law restricting enforcement of such contracts. As a result of
this
decision, federal savings and loan associations will have, at least in the near future, a lending
advantage over state
lending institutions.
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DEEDS AND TITLES

The New Mexico appellate courts decided six cases this term which
involved deeds and titles. Four are of primary significance. 80 As will be
apparent from the discussion which follows, the four cases represent
varied and sometimes unique fact patterns. However, at least one of the
cases, Hartman v. Shambaugh,8' answers a question of general significance: the measure of damages available from a title insurance company
when an insured title fails.
In Hartman, several defendants in a quiet title action sought a court
determination of the title insurance company's liability. In this case, title
had failed to a portion of a tract rather than the entire tract. There was
evidence which apparently proved that the balance of the tract was sufficiently valuable to offset the diminution in value of the tract on which
title failed.82 The trial court determined that the purchaser whose title
failed had suffered no loss for which damages were recoverable. The
New Mexico Supreme Court disagreed, reversed and remanded, directing
the trial court to take further evidence.
In remanding, the supreme court gave guidance on the issue of damages, a question of first impression in New Mexico. That issue, as the
court analyzed the problem, had several parts. First, the court determined
that the insured is entitled to recover up to the policy limits even though
title failed on only a portion of the premises. This seems to be the general
rule,83 and that fact apparently influenced the court. 84
Second, the Hartman court thought that the trial court needed to take
additional evidence on actual loss by the insured. The supreme court
80. Two of the cases were primarily significant for the procedural issues they decided. Each of
the two, however, contributed in part to the body of law governing deeds and titles. In Santistevan
v. Centinel Bank, 96 N.M. 730, 634 P.2d 1282 (1981), the supreme court decided, among other
things, that a referee's order to abandon a debtor's property causes title to revert irrevocably to the
debtor even though the debtor had intentionally misstated material facts about the property in his
petition for bankruptcy. The trustee in bankruptcy had moved, in the course of the bankruptcy
proceedings, to abandon the property, alleging that he had investigated the debtor's statements.
Despite the debtor's fraud, title reverted to him upon the trustee's abandonment. Thus, the debtor
was a real party in interest in a subsequent suit for damages with respect to the property in question.
In Pacheco v. Martinez, 97 N.M. 37, 636 P.2d 308 (Ct. App. 1981), the plaintiffs filed suit for
trespass and damages for the timber cut without consent. In undertaking to adjudicate the boundary,
the court admitted over objection a re-survey which was not based on established points in the
original survey and was not done in connection with the relevant deeds. The court of appeals held
that such a survey was inadmissible in an action to.construe a deed description.
81. 96 N.M. 359, 630 P.2d 758 (1981). For further discussion of Hartman, see Note, Title
Insurance-New Mexico Sets the Date for Determination of Value in Title Insurance Cases: Hartman
v. Shambaugh, 12 N.M.L. Rev. 833 (1982).
82. 96 N.M. at 361, 630 P.2d at 760. The opinion is not very clear on this point. The trial court
held that title to lands remaining in the insured had value equal to or in excess of the difference
between the price he paid and the amount received from other sources by him. Presumably the
insured had received amounts from a purchaser.
83. See cases collected in Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 972 (1958).
84. 96 N.M. at 362, 630 P.2d at 761.
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suggested that the purchase price of the portion on which title failed was
insufficient evidence of such loss. Another, more appropriate measure is
the difference between the actual value if there had been no impairment
and the value as impaired, plus incidental damages. Further, the court
observed, actual value without impairment might be something other than
the purchase price.
Third, the court considered the crucial question whether value should
be figured as of the date of purchase, the date the defect was discovered,
or the date of trial. The court reviewed cases from other jurisdictions and
adopted the rule that the value should be computed as of the date the
defect is discovered.
The court noted that the cases from other jurisdictions are not in agreement and that the intent of the parties to the contract of title insurance
probably is best served by a date other than the date of purchase. Finally,
the court concluded, adopting the date the defect is discovered fulfills
the intent of the parties and provides certainty as to liability. The title
insurance policy in this case required the insured to notify promptly of
adverse claims. The supreme court in part adopted the date of discovery
as most compatible with the policy terms and in part elected a rule which
would not give the insured a windfall.
The other cases in this area are somewhat less dramatic in scope. In
First National Bank in Albuquerque v. Enriquez,85 the New Mexico Supreme Court extended the concept that a forged deed is ineffective. The
bank sued to set aside a quitclaim deed from its debtor to another. The
grantee claimed she was the lawful owner and that the bank's debtor had
secured record title by forgery. The trial court agreed that there had been
a forgery but concluded that the property owner had contributed to the
forgery when she permitted the bank's debtor, her uncle, to control her
property and that she was estopped from asserting her right. The supreme
court reversed, stating that a forged deed can have no effect, not even to
work an estoppel.
A more familiar problem arose in Ohl v. Ohl.86 In this case, a wife
petitioned for dissolution of the marriage. A trial court dissolved the
marriage, awarding the parties' residence to the husband as his separate
property, although the property had been held by the husband and wife
as joint tenants. On appeal by the wife, the New Mexico Supreme Court
held that the trial court properly considered extrinsic evidence in construing the deed. The court noted that the deed itself had not been introduced into evidence, that the legislature intended that such evidence be
85. 96 N.M. 714, 634 P.2d 1266 (1981).
86. 97 N.M. 175, 637 P.2d 1230 (1981).
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considered when available, 87 and that case law supported the use of such
evidence. Further, the court found that the husband's testimony together
with circumstantial evidence tending to support his testimony was sufficient to overcome the language of the deed. In this case, the husband
had conveyed his separate property into joint tenancy with his wife so
that she would have a place to live should he die and the arrangement
was intended to be effective only so long as they lived together.
This term, as in other recent terms,88 the court considered the question
of an implied conveyance by reason of the doctrine of acquiescence. In
Cauble v. Beals,89 the Caubles sued to eject Beals from a strip of land
claimed by Cauble. Beals counterclaimed for quiet title on grounds of
adverse possession and acquiescence in a common boundary. Beals showed
that from 1959 a fence had been in place between his property and that
of Cauble, that the fence was inside his neighbor's line, and that from
1967 to 1978 Beals had made improvements within the unfenced area
belonging to his neighbor. The supreme court reversed the trial court's
decision that Beals had acquired title to the disputed strip on grounds of
acquiescence and estoppel.
The Cauble court noted that there was no evidence of the owners of
the land prior to 1976 having accepted the fence as a boundary. The State
of New Mexico owned the land when the fence was erected by the state's
lessee under a grazing lease. The lessee wanted to prevent "tie-ins" by
adjoining landowners. The court also thought there was insufficient evidence of the owners being aware of the fence's existence prior to 1976.
The court observed that even if there were sufficient evidence of acceptance in 1976, the three-year period thereafter and prior to suit was
insufficient to qualify for "acquiescence."
The language of the Cauble decision seems to restrict the doctrine of
acquiescence. The court did not consider the possibility that the doctrine
of acquiescence is based on more than notions of estoppel, for which
knowledge and wrongful conduct would be significant. New Mexico cases
on acquiescence may stem from the principle of repose' as well as the
principle that an ancient fence represents the best evidence of a true
boundary.9'

Because of the facts of this case, however, the result is not inconsistent
87. The court cited N.M. Stat. Ann. §47-1-16 (1978).
88. See, e.g., Baehr, Property, Survey of New Mexico Law: 1980-81, 12 N.M.L. Rev. 459, 46062 (1982).
89. 96 N.M. 443, 631 P.2d 1311 (1981).
90. See Sachs v. Board of Trustees, 89 N.M. 712, 557 P.2d 209 (1976).
91. See Woodburn v. Grimes, 58 N.M. 717, 275 P.2d 850 (1954).
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with the slender body of New Mexico case law. 92 The evidence at trial
had established when, why, and by whom the fence was built, and apparently the true boundary was known. The "ancient fence" cases certainly are inapposite. 93 The facts of Cauble were not very strong for
estoppel. 94 Finally, the fact that the land had been under state ownership
for a time may have been a tacit consideration. The relationship of acquiescence -to the sovereign in New Mexico remains unclear. 95
PUBLIC CONTROL OF LAND USE

In the area of public regulation of land use, the New Mexico Supreme
Court decided six cases. Two cases presented valuation problems in the
context of eminent domain proceedings.96 Four cases provided the courts
with zoning problems of widely disparate character.97 One case arose
under the Cultural Properties Act. 98
Both eminent domain opinions reviewed the elements to be taken into
account in awarding damages. In City of Clovis v. Ware, 99 the supreme

court held that the jury properly considered diminution in value of the
condemnee's remaining land. The fact that a sewage disposal plant was
to be placed on the portion of land which had been condemned brought
about the diminution in value. The supreme court noted that the legislature
had provided expressly for consideration of such a fact.'°0
92. See generally S. Bowman, Boundary Disputes and the Doctrine of Acquiescence in New
Mexico (1981) (unpublished manuscript written in satisfaction of independent research requirements
by Mr. Bowman, J.D., University of New Mexico, 1981, during his third year of law school). Mr.
Bowman concluded that three elements must be present for a valid claim of acquiescence: "Adjoining
landowners must have mutually recognized a clear and definite boundary for a long period of time.'
Id. (emphasis added).
93. The "ancient fence" opinions strongly intimate that where the "true boundary" can be
determined, it controls.
94. The record owners of the property, against whom the defendants argued estoppel, were not
aware of either the true boundary or the fence line constructed by the party claiming title by
acquiescence until shortly before Cauble bought the property in 1976. In 1976, Cauble knew about
the fence and improvements, but he did not learn of the encroachment until 1978. Cauble v. Beals,
96 N.M. at 445, 631 P.2d at 1313 (1981). There was evidence that an employee of the record owner
of a one-half interest had seen the fence in mid-1976. Id. The improvements by Beal began in 1967
and continued until 1978. Id. at 444, 631 P.2d at 1312. It was, therefore, difficult to argue that the
record owners had acted so as to mislead their neighbor, while possessing knowledge of the real
facts, and the court made short work of the argument.
95. But see Sproles v. McDonald, 70 N.M. 168, 372 P.2d 122 (1962).
96. The two eminent domain cases are City of Clovis v. Ware, 96 N.M. 479, 632 P.2d 356
(1981),.and El Paso Elec. Co. v. Pinkerton, 96 N.M. 473, 632 P.2d 350 (1981).
97. The four zoning cases are Singleterry v. City of Albuquerque, 96 N.M. 468, 632 P.2d 345
(1981); Texas Nat'l Theatres, Inc. v. City of Albuquerque, 97 N.M. 282, 639 P.2d 569 (1982); City
of Santa Fe v. Armijo, 96 N.M. 663, 634 P.2d 685 (1981); and Mechem v. City of Santa Fe, 96
N.M. 668, 634 P.2d 690 (1981).
98. The Cultural Properties Act is contained in N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 18-6-1 to -17 (Repl. Pamp.
1980).
99. 96 N.M. 479, 632 P.2d 356 (1981).
100. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §42A-1-26 (Repl. Pamp. 1981).
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In El Paso Electric Co. v. Pinkerton,'01 the taking had been partial and
the jury had been permitted to consider loss of crops as an element of
special damages. The judge had adapted a uniform jury instruction, and
the supreme court sustained the trial court's decision.
The court said that in a partial taking the measure of damages, which
is designed to compensate the landowner for diminution in value caused
by the taking, should be the difference in value immediately before and
immediately after the taking. The court concluded that loss of crops had
been properly considered because a willing buyer and a willing seller
would consider the value of an existing crop in arriving at a price.
The four zoning cases all concerned the scope of the zoning power.
In Singleterry v. City of Albuquerque,'0 2 a landowner had secured a variance for an extra-high fence. The variance had been conditioned on the
landowner's lowering a block wall on another part of his property. The
landowner argued that the condition was illegal because lowering the wall
would put him in breach of a restrictive covenant within his deed. The
trial court agreed with the landowner and ordered that the condition be
eliminated.
The New Mexico Supreme Court reversed, holding that although the
zoning authority should consider existing covenants in granting variances,
it had the discretion to grant a variance which might violate existing
covenants. The court noted that such covenants must be enforced by
individuals, who might have lost their right of enforcement or who might
imposed
elect not to enforce. Further, the court held that the condition
03
by the city counsel was within its statutory authority. 1
In Mechem v. City of Santa Fe,'0 some of the same statutory provisions
were at issue. In this case the court limited the zoning authority. In 1967,
the Santa Fe Board of Adjustment granted a special exception to Mechem
to operate a special tennis club. The Board specified that the exception
would terminate with any change in ownership. Mechem sought declaratory and injunctive relief from the ownership specification.
The New Mexico Supreme Court reversed a trial court decision for the
city, reasoning that the city had no zoning authority beyond the statute
and that powers not expressly stated must arise by necessary implication
and be reasonably related to the objectives of zoning to be valid. Further,
101. 96 N.M. 473, 632 P.2d 350 (1981).
102. 96 N.M. 468, 632 P.2d 345 (1981). For further discussion of this case, see Shapiro &
Jacobvitz, Administrative Law, ante at 235.
103. The statute construed by the court was N.M. Stat. Ann. § 3-21-8(C)(1)(a)-(c) (Cum. Supp.
1982).
104. 96 N.M. 668, 634 P.2d 690 (1981). For further discussion of this case, see Shapiro &
Jacobvitz, Administrative Law, ante at 235.
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this special exception was not reasonably related to zoning function, at
least in part because it practically restricted Mechem's right to alienate.
In Texas National Theatres, Inc. v. City of Albuquerque, 105 the New
Mexico Supreme Court sustained an amendment to the Albuquerque zoning ordinance against a claim that the amendment was unconstitutionally
vague and failed to satisfy statutory zoning requirements. The court also
affirmed the trial court's decision that the amendment was applicable to
the appellant. In this case, the appellant, an adult drive-in theatre, had
been allowed to continue operation as an exempt, nonconforming use
after enactment of the amendment. The amendment prohibited adult driveins located within 500 feet of a residential zone. There was sufficient
evidence to support the trial court finding that the appellant had abandoned
its nonconforming use status and thereafter had resumed operation in
violation of the statute.
The court sustained the portion of the ordinance as amended, although
the ordinance failed to specify the method by which the 500 feet was to
be measured. The court observed that the trial court had found that the
method of measurement employed by the police was both reasonable and
fairly applied in every case and that the city had delegated by ordinance
to a zoning enforcement officer the duty to enforce the ordinance. Further,
the court found that the purpose of the ordinance as amended was sufficiently certain to satisfy New Mexico statutory requirements.10 6 Thus,
this decision represents a victory for public control of land use by recognizing the zoning authority's authority to delegate some enforcement
decisions.
In City of Santa Fe v. Armijo, 107 the Commissioner of Public Lands
placed an oil rig on the premises of the state land office without a city
permit. The city filed suit claiming a violation of Santa Fe's historical
district zoning ordinances. The trial court found for the city, but the New
Mexico Supreme Court reversed, holding that the city had not established
that its ordinances were applicable to state land. The trial court had found
that the state Historic District Act'0 8 permitted the city's ordinances to
apply to state land. The supreme court disgreed, noting that the state
legislation had been enacted after the city ordinances were adopted. The
majority opinion leaves open the question whether city ordinances, even
when promulgated after the state Historic District Act, can affect state
land. 09
'
105. 97 N.M. 282, 639 P.2d 569 (1982).
106. The statute which the court construed was N.M. Stat. Ann. §3-21-6(A)(1) (Cum. Supp.
1982).
107. 96 N.M. 663, 634 P.2d 685 (1981).
108. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§3-22-1 to -5 (1978).
109. Senior Justice Sosa, specially concurring, however, indicated that he believed that the statute
does permit municipalities to affect state land. City of Santa Fe v. Armijo, 96 N.M. at 666, 634
P.2d at 688 (Sosa, S.J., specially concurring).
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In Turley v. State,"' the New Mexico appellate courts for the first time
construed a key provision of the Cultural Properties Act.' Under the
Act, it is a crime to excavate an archaeological site on another's property
without a permit." 2 The defendant had been employed by the landowner.
The statute specifically exempts the landowner from the requirement of
a permit for "personal excavation of his own land."'" The issue in this
case was whether the landowner must perform the excavation personally
or obtain a permit. The court of appeals held that the excavation must
be done personally, but the supreme court disagreed. As the supreme
court viewed the problem, the statute had not clearly taken away the
general right of an individual to act through an agent.
ACTIONS: DAMAGES AND PROCEDURE

The appellate courts considered eight cases in which the central or an
important problem was a question of remedy. Three of the cases also
raised issues closely related to substantive law topics. These are Hartman
v. Shambaugh, 114 First National Bank v. Julian,"5 and Security Bank &
Trust v. Parmer. 6 Because these have been discussed extensively elsewhere," 7 they will not be discussed in this section. The cases treated in
this section concern punitive damages, fraud or misrepresentation, and
relief available in an action for trespass. The cases overlap, as will be
evident in the discussion that follows.
Several cases produced holdings with respect to punitive damages. In
Lujan v. Pendaries Properties, Inc.,' plaintiffs had sued for specific
performance of a real estate purchase agreement and for compensatory
and punitive damages. The trial court had awarded punitive damages, as
well as compensatory damages, against a defendant whose refusal to
release a security interest in certain real estate had prevented the plaintiffs
from securing an advantageous financing arrangement. The supreme court
found that the trial court had erred in granting punitive damages; the
defendant had acted wrongfully but he acted in a good faith belief that
he was not required to release the lien and on advice of counsel.
In North v. Public Service Co., 1"' the New Mexico Court of Appeals
ruled more favorably for plaintiffs seeking punitive damages. In this case,
110.
I11.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
Bank v.
72-76.
118.
119.

96 N.M. 579, 633 P.2d 687 (1981).
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 18-6-11 (Repl. Pamp. 1980).
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 18-6-11(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1980).
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 18-6-11(D) (Repl. Pamp. 1980).
96 N.M. 359, 630 P.2d 758 (1981).
96 N.M. 38, 627 P.2d 880 (1981).
97 N.M. 108, 637 P.2d 539 (1981).
For Hartman v. Shambaugh, see supra text accompanying notes 81-84; for FirstNational
Julian and Security National Bank & Trust v. Parmer, see supra text accompanying notes
96 N.M. 771, 635 P.2d 580 (1981).
97 N.M. 406, 640 P.2d 512 (Ct. App. 1981).
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a property owner sued for trespass, asking compensatory and punitive
damages. The plaintiff owned a lot in the Manzano Mountains upon which
he planned to build a residence. Over plaintiff's objections, Public Service
Co. representatives located poles either on plaintiff's property or in obstruction of his easement access and destroyed vegetation and some trees,
although an alternative location for the easement existed. The trial court
granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, but the court of
appeals remanded for trial on the merits.
In the view of the court of appeals, there were issues of fact from
which a jury might award punitive damages. These were as follows: (1)
the plaintiff had refused to give an easement or accept poles on his land;
(2) defendant's subsequent conduct, including its refusal to cooperate in
repairing the damage its representatives caused and its suit for inverse
condemnation, could be construed as an unnecessary taking of an easement against plaintiff's consent; and (3) there was sufficient evidence of
ratification of the injury from the fact that a company official signed the
petition for inverse condemnation.
In Wirth v. Commercial Resources, Inc., 20 the jury awarded $10,000
in punitive damages and the court of appeals affirmed, but the more
significant issues involved fraud and the award of compensatory damages.
In Wirth, purchasers sued to recover damages for fraud based on the
defendant land developers' failure to disclose an adverse hydrologist report which indicated that there might not be sufficient water for the
proposed subdivision. The developers had agreed to provide water for
plaintiffs' domestic use. Among other things, the court of appeals held
that having discussed the availability of water with the plaintiffs, the
defendants had a duty to disclose all material facts, including the adverse
report.
The court distinguished Krupiak v. Payton,'2' noting that here the problem was not self-evident and that the defendants had superior knowledge
through the adverse report. Further, the court held that the purchaser was
under no duty to investigate the developers' statements even though the
hydrologist report was a matter of public record.
The damages awarded in Wirth are interesting. The court did not require
the plaintiff to prove the cost of obtaining an adequate water supply but
rather permitted the plaintiff to prove and recover the difference between
the actual value of the land and the price paid for it. Further, the court
permitted the plaintiffs to testify that the house was worthless without
adequate water supply. The court observed that there was other, expert
testimony to the same effect.
120. 96 N.M. 340, 630 P.2d 292 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 96 N.M. 543, 632 P.2d 1181 (1981).
121. 90 N.M. 252, 561 P.2d 1345 (1977).
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In Cargill v. Sherrod,2 2 on the other hand, the supreme court refused
to find an actionable false representation. In Cargill, the defendants had
advertised land as being in an agricultural and partly residential zone in
which range farming and dairy activities were permissible. The defendants
also advertised the property as choice commercial acreage, by virtue of
its location. The court found that taken as a whole the purchasers were
on notice from the advertisement that a change in zoning or a special use
permit would be required. Because there was evidence that the zoning
authorities would consider a petition for a special use permit, the court
found that the evidence showed that the advertisement was truthful.
In addition to the mortgage cases discussed in the section "Contracts
and Financing," supra,' 23 one other case this term concerned procedural
matters. The results in Pacheco v. Martinez'24 evidenced the limits of a
suit for trespass under New Mexico law and suggested the comparative
worth of a suit to quiet title. In Pacheco, the court acknowledged that in
entertaining an action for trespass to which a plea for equitable relief had
been joined, a court might adjudicate a boundary location. The court
reversed and remanded that part of the decree which recognized fee simple
ownership in the plaintiff because it went beyond the scope of the pleadings.
Further, the court reversed and remanded the -trial court's construction
of the deed. The lower court had in effect reformed the deed although
reformation had not been pleaded. Without reformation, the deed did not
establish the boundary line.' 25
CONCLUSION
The property cases decided by the New Mexico appellate courts this
term have enriched existing case law in several areas. For example, in
the area of landlord-tenant, which has few commercial lease precedents
and a new statute governing residential leases, the work of the appellate
courts this term provides significant guidance to the practitioner in advising landlords and tenants. Further, the appellate courts this term decided a number of cases in which a key issue was the measure of damages
or the scope of the remedy.
Some areas, however, remain murky. For example, in the area of
prescriptive easements and with respect to the doctrine of acquiescence,
122. 96 N.M. 431, 631 P.2d 726 (1981).
123. First Nat'l Bank v. Julian, 96 N.M. 38, 627 P.2d 880 (1981); Security Bank & Trust v.
Parmer, 97 N.M. 108, 637 P.2d 539 (1981).
124. 97 N.M. 37, 636 P.2d 308 (Ct. App. 1981). This case is also discussed supra note 80.
125. The court of appeals held that the trial court had erred in admitting a survey to construe the
deeds in question. Without reformation, the deed did not establish the boundary as plaintiff claimed.
See discussion of this issue supra note 80.
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the work of the courts has been helpful but not definitive. Thus, the
practicing lawyer who must litigate an easement case probably will add
a claim for a prescriptive easement not with assurance of probable success
but instead as an alternative and "fall-back" position. Similarly, the
doctrine of acquiescence remains unclarified in several key respects. To
make these observations, of course, is not to criticize the courts, which
must decide the cases which arise, but rather to suggest the gaps which
remain in several important doctrinal areas.
The cases in the areas of contract and financing, deeds and titles, and
land use regulation do not appear to reflect, as a whole, clear trends in
property law. There were many valuable decisions, but as a whole the
results represent an eclectic group.
The distinctive character of property law as a technical and conceptually
rich body of law remains. The specific developments, then, taken as a
whole, are relatively conservative. As the body of property case law
grows, however, such developments will enable continuing reform and
readjustment.

